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1. Introduction 
A household is food secure if it has access to enough food for an active, healthy life of all of its 
members; it is food insecure otherwise (NRC, 2006). Substantial prevalence of food insecurity in 
the low-income U.S. population is a matter of public concern, since food insecurity can be 
detrimental to the health and well-being of adults and children (for a literature review, see 
Gundersen, Kreider, and Pepper, 2011). In fact, among households with income below 130% of 
the federal poverty threshold in 2016, 35.7% experienced food insecurity (Coleman-Jensen et al., 
2017a; 2017b).1 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) administers 15 domestic food assistance 
programs designed to alleviate food insecurity (Oliveira, 2017). Many low-income households 
are eligible for and participate in more than one program. The largest and third largest programs 
by expenditures are, respectively, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP; $68.1 
billion spent in the fiscal year 2017, 42.2 million participants on average per month) and Special 
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC; $5.7 billion, 7.3 
million participants).2 These two programs are the focus of our paper.  
While both SNAP and WIC are means-tested and aim to provide resources to low-income 
households for the acquisition of food, they differ in several respects (Hoynes and 
Schanzenbach, 2015; U.S. GAO, 2010). SNAP offers vouchers to eligible low-income 
households for the purchase of most food items. In contrast, WIC provides benefits to qualifying 
individuals in low-income households for the purchase of a restricted set of foods identified to 
meet the specific nutritional needs of pregnant, post-partum, and lactating women; infants; and 
children less than 5 years old. WIC also provides nutrition counseling and referrals for health 
services. Differences in the program design may lead to synergies between SNAP and WIC.3 For 
example, WIC expands acquisition of specific foods and may lead to increased awareness of 
                                                 
1 The rate of food insecurity among all U.S. households was 12.3% (Coleman-Jensen et al., 2017a). 
2 The second largest program is the National School Lunch Program (NSLP). 
3 Brien and Swann (2000) find that synergies can reinforce welfare programs’ effects. 
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healthy food selection and food purchases that better meet household nutritional needs. In turn, 
SNAP provides a wider choice over foods. Investigating whether either program has a positive 
marginal effect on food security given participation in the other is informative about potential 
programmatic redundancies and contributes to a better understanding of the overall efficacy of 
the food safety net in the United States. 
In practice, the rate of food insecurity among food program recipients is substantial. In 
particular, 51.2% of households on SNAP and 40.6% on WIC were food insecure in 2016. 
Moreover, the rate of food insecurity among SNAP (WIC) recipients was twice (1.4 times) that 
among potentially eligible, low-income nonrecipients (Coleman-Jensen et al., 2017a). These 
seemingly counterintuitive associations (especially in view of the programs’ shared objective to 
reduce food insecurity) provide an additional motivation for studying SNAP and WIC effects. 
Identifying causal, rather than associative, effects of any food program is challenging 
because of (i) endogenous self-selection of households into the program and (ii) pervasive 
underreporting of food assistance in national surveys. In particular, unobserved personal 
characteristics (e.g., expected future health status) are thought to be related to both food security 
and program participation. This simultaneity precludes the use of simple regression techniques 
(e.g., OLS) to estimate causal effects (see Gundersen and Oliveira, 2001; Jensen, 2002; Fox, 
Hamilton, and Lin, 2004; Wilde, 2007; Nord and Golla, 2009). Furthermore, households are 
thought to systematically underreport the receipt of food assistance (e.g., Bollinger and David, 
1997; Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan, 2015a; 2015b), and the propensity to misreport may vary 
across households based on their observed and unobserved characteristics. For example, Meyer 
et al. (2015a) find that less than 60% of SNAP benefits are recorded in recent waves of the 
Current Population Survey (CPS). Bitler, Currie, and Scholz (2003) find evidence of “severe” 
underreporting of WIC benefits. Under such circumstances, all of the classical measurement 
error assumptions are violated, and it becomes particularly important to locate and use any 
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available validation information as a means to mitigate the measurement error problem. In turn, 
analyzing not just one, but two programs adds an extra layer of complexity.4 
In this paper, we quantify how participation in both SNAP and WIC affects a household’s 
probability of being food secure compared with participation in SNAP alone. To estimate causal 
treatment effects, we apply nonparametric bounding methods developed by Jensen, Kreider, and 
Zhylyevskyy (2018; hereafter JKZ) to address joint program participation. These methods allow 
us to place bounds on the causal treatment effects and account for the dual identification 
problems of endogenous selection and potentially misreported program participation status when 
auxiliary information is available to validate self-reported participation in one program (e.g., 
SNAP) but not the other (e.g., WIC). The dual identification problems pose an obstacle to 
applying standard instrumental variable (IV) techniques to quantify treatment effects, since such 
techniques are known to produce inconsistent estimates when an endogenous binary treatment 
variable (e.g., program participation vs. nonparticipation) is mismeasured (e.g., Black et al., 
2000; Frazis and Loewenstein, 2003).5 If the self-reported indicator of participation is measured 
with error, it is likely that a valid instrument for receipt is correlated with the measurement error 
as well. Even in the absence of measurement error, it may still be difficult in practice to find IVs 
that are both valid and strong. For example, variation in policy instruments across states that 
affect food assistance participation rates may be endogenously related to food insecurity.6  
The approach in JKZ generalizes methods in Kreider and Hill (2009) and Kreider et al. 
(2012), which accommodate binary treatments (e.g., SNAP vs. no SNAP), to handle the case of 
partially ordered multiple treatments. We derive sharp bounds on average treatment effects 
                                                 
4 To avoid further complexity, we abstract away from the issue of potentially mismeasured food security status. To 
the extent that such misclassification exists, the identified bounds on treatment effects reported in this paper would 
become wider. 
5 Mismeasurement of a binary variable induces a nonclassical measurement error even if such errors occur 
randomly, and in our setting errors are systematic in one direction and likely related to household characteristics. 
6 The policies are not randomly assigned, and policies targeted towards participation (such as eligibility rules or ease 
of recertification) may be correlated with other state policies that could directly affect food security (e.g. policies 
that affect the financial well-being of poorer households and therefore their ability to buy food).    
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(ATEs) that are logically consistent with the observed data, available validation information, and 
imposed statistical and behavioral assumptions on the data-generating process. This 
methodology differs from the multiple-programs approaches of Fraker and Moffitt (1988), Keane 
and Moffitt (1998), and Brien and Swann (2001) who model participation decisions and program 
effects jointly using simultaneous equations in parametric settings. We also allow for 
underreported participation status. 
We apply our methods to data from the USDA’s National Household Food Acquisition 
and Purchase Survey (FoodAPS). Among existing nationally representative datasets, FoodAPS is 
particularly well suited for the analysis as it provides self-reported household participation in 
SNAP and WIC and, furthermore, contains auxiliary administrative data to validate self-reported 
SNAP participation.7 In total, FoodAPS contains records for 4,826 households who participated 
in the survey during one week between April 2012 and January 2013. We focus only on those 
households that would be eligible to participate in SNAP and WIC concurrently. Given the 
eligibility restrictions associated with each of the two programs, we analyze households with 
income below 130% of the poverty threshold and containing a pregnant woman, or a child aged 
less than five years.8 The analytical sample contains 460 households, 37% of whom report being 
on both programs. 
Our empirical analysis starts by estimating the bounds on the ATE of participating in 
SNAP and WIC jointly vs. in SNAP alone under minimal assumptions. These worst-case bounds 
are wide and do not allow us to sign the ATE. We then investigate how several middle ground 
assumptions can narrow the worst-case bounds by restricting relationships between the latent 
food security outcomes, program participation, and observed covariates. For example, we study 
the identifying power of an assumption that, on average, the probability of a favorable food 
                                                 
7 No administrative data to validate WIC participation are available in FoodAPS. 
8 It should be noted that while the income eligibility cutoff is 185% of the poverty threshold in the case of the WIC 
program, more than 86% of WIC households had incomes at 130% of poverty and below in 2014 (Thorn et al., 
2015, Table III.6 on p. 44). 
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security outcome weakly rises with more household expenditures on food at home relative to 
expenditures consistent with the Thrifty Food Plan (Carlson et al., 2007). Unlike standard IVs, 
MIVs require no exclusion restrictions. The trade-off is that we are only able to bound and not 
point-identify causal effects. Still, when combined with the FoodAPS data, our assumptions are 
strong enough to identify substantial beneficial effects of participating in multiple food 
assistance programs. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
characteristics of our analytical sample. Section 3 lays out the methodological framework, 
formally defines the identification problems, and employs several new sets of closed-form 
analytical formulas derived in JKZ to bound ATEs given a potentially mismeasured, partially 
ordered, and partially verified treatment.  Our empirical results highlight the identifying power of 
successively stronger nonparametric assumptions. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Data 
2.1. FoodAPS 
Our main data source is the USDA’s National Household Food Acquisition and Purchase Survey 
(FoodAPS), a recent nationally representative survey to collect comprehensive data about 
household food purchases and acquisitions.9 The survey was administered on a stratified sample 
of 4,826 households between April 2012 and January 2013. The sample was drawn from three 
population groups: SNAP households, low-income households not participating in SNAP, and 
higher income households. Each household participated in the survey for one seven-day week. 
FoodAPS captures detailed information about purchases and acquisitions of food items 
intended for consumption at home and away from home, including items acquired through 
USDA’s food assistance programs, as well as the amount and source of payment for food. The 
survey also collects information about household and personal attributes, including demographic 
                                                 
9 FoodAPS was co-sponsored by ERS and FNS and was conducted in the field by Mathematica Policy Research. 
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and socioeconomic characteristics, income, receipt of SNAP benefits, confirmation of SNAP 
receipt through an administrative match, and self-reported WIC receipt along with information to 
determine WIC eligibility. 
Among other data reported, households filled out a 10-item food security questionnaire 
(referenced to the last 30 days), which is the basis for calculating raw food security scores and 
assigning households to categories of food security. Using the USDA’s 30-day adult food 
security scale, “food insecure” households are those with the raw score of 3 or more.10 Those 
with scores of 0, 1, or 2 are labeled as “food secure.” 
Through its Geography Component (FoodAPS-GC), the survey provides information 
about the local food environment, including the location of food retailers, measures of access to 
these retailers, food prices, and food-related public policies.11 We employ FoodAPS-GC to 
construct variables that can be used as MIVs. In particular, we use local food price data to 
construct measures of the cost of TFP consistent with each household’s size and composition. 
The TFP measures vary with respect to the geographic level of price aggregation: county vs. 
stores located within 20 miles of the household. We then construct a food expenditure MIV by 
dividing reported household expenditures on food at home by the TFP cost.12 
2.2. Analytical Sample 
We focus on FoodAPS households that would be eligible to participate in SNAP and WIC 
concurrently. Given the eligibility restrictions associated with these programs, our analytical 
sample is comprised of 460 households with income below 130% of the poverty threshold and 
                                                 
10 Such households can be further categorized as having “low food security” (score of 3-5) or “very low food 
security” (6-10). 
11 Many variables pertaining to these public policies come from the SNAP Policy Database (ERS, 2017b). They 
refer to SNAP policies and design features at the state level, including the magnitude of outreach expenditures, 
length of recertification periods, exemptions from the household asset test, reporting requirements, and 
fingerprinting of applicants, among others. The literature often uses these variables as IVs for SNAP participation 
(e.g., Gregory and Deb, 2015; Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Zhang, 2011; Yen et al., 2008).  
12 Our analysis involves using confidential geographic identifiers and other restricted-access FoodAPS data. We 
access them through a secure data enclave of the National Opinion Research Center (NORC). For details on publicly 
available FoodAPS data, see ERS (2017a). 
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containing a pregnant woman, or a child aged less than five years. All sample statistics and 
estimates incorporate FoodAPS household weights. 
Table 1 provides the joint distribution of our analytical sample by self-reported, current 
household participation in SNAP and WIC.13 The table shows that joint participation in the two 
programs is empirically relevant: 36.7% of the households report being on both SNAP and WIC. 
Also, 16.6% are reportedly on WIC but not SNAP, and 31.4% are on SNAP but not WIC. The 
remaining 15.3% indicate no participation in either program. 
To ascertain SNAP participation, Mathematica Policy Research matched FoodAPS 
households to SNAP administrative records. Not all households could be matched in practice, 
however. Among the households in our sample, 57.6% are matched and confirmed SNAP 
participants, 2.6% are matched and confirmed nonparticipants, 37.5% could not be matched 
(most likely due to their genuine absence from the administrative records), and 2.3% withheld 
consent to be matched. Regrettably, FoodAPS contains no validation data on WIC participation. 
Thus, while we treat all sample households as “verified” with respect to SNAP participation 
status, no household is verified regarding WIC participation. 
Table 2 is similar to Table 1, except that the SNAP participation indicator now 
incorporates administrative data in FoodAPS. In particular, for households that got matched to 
administrative records, SNAP status comes from the administrative record. In all other instances, 
SNAP participation is self-reported. Compared to the distribution in Table 1, the incorporation of 
administrative data about SNAP leads to an increase in the overall prevalence of SNAP 
participation by 5.2 percentage points. More specifically, the prevalence of households on SNAP 
but not on WIC increases by 2.2 percentage points (from 31.4% to 33.6%), while the prevalence 
of households on both SNAP and WIC rises by 3 percentage points (from 36.7% to 39.7%). 
Table 3 provides the prevalence of food security in each of four subsamples defined 
according to self-reported household participation in SNAP and WIC. The rate of food security 
                                                 
13 In FoodAPS, questions about SNAP and WIC refer to current participation. 
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exceeds 50% throughout, but somewhat varies across the subsamples. (The rate of food security 
in the analytical sample overall is 55.0%.) Given no WIC receipt, self-reported SNAP 
participation is associated with a decrease in the prevalence of food security from 53.2% to 
52.2%, which is in line with a negative association between food security and SNAP found in the 
literature (see Gundersen et al., 2011). When WIC is in place, however, SNAP is associated with 
an increase in the food security rate from 54.5% to 58.5%. Perhaps the process of selecting into 
SNAP differs depending on whether the household participates in WIC, or perhaps there are 
synergies between the two programs in promoting food security. Also, the table shows that WIC 
participation is always associated with more food security given a self-reported SNAP status. 
Table 4, which replaces the self-reported SNAP participation indicator with the 
administratively matched one, likewise shows food security rates in excess of 50% and varying a 
bit across the four subsamples. With one exception, the table indicates similar associations 
between the participation indicators and food security to those implied by Table 3. The only 
exception is that given no SNAP receipt, self-reported WIC participation is now associated with 
less (rather than more) food security.  
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for selected characteristics of the sample. On 
average, the households contain 4.5 members (of all ages), 2.3 children (aged < 18 years), and 
1.6 young children (aged 0–6 years). Average monthly household income is about $1,600, 
income-to-poverty ratio is 0.75, and weekly expenditures on food at home are about $113. 
Twenty-one percent of the households live in rural areas, 78% rent their residence, 26% do not 
own or lease a vehicle, and 11% have used a food pantry in the past 30 days. Primary 
respondents in these households are predominantly female (88%) and just under 34 years old on 
average. Thirty-three percent are Hispanic, 55% are White, 29% are Black, 32% have no high 
school degree, 32% have a high school degree or GED, 28% have some college education but no 
bachelor’s degree, and 7% have a bachelor’s degree. Also, 44% are single, 29% are married, 
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25% are divorced or separated, and 2% are widowed; 43% are employed, 17% are looking for 
work, and 40% are not working. 
3. Methodology and results 
3.1. General Framework 
Applying the methods developed in JKZ, let the outcome Y = 1 indicate that a household 
is food secure, with Y = 0 otherwise.  Let S ∗ be an unobserved indicator of true program 
participation where = 0S ∗  denotes no participation in SNAP or WIC, = 1S ∗  denotes participation 
in SNAP alone, = 2S ∗  denotes participation in WIC alone, and = 3S ∗  denotes participation in 
both SNAP and WIC. This treatment variable is partially ordered: = 1 or 2S ∗  denotes some 
participation in food assistance programs, while = 0S ∗  does not, and = 3S ∗  involves more 
participation. (Since = 1S ∗  and = 2S ∗  represent different programs, these two treatments are not 
ordered.) 
Instead of observing S ∗ in the data, we observe a self-reported counterpart, S. We also 
observe FoodAPS administrative information on SNAP. Let 1SNAPV =  denote verification that a 
household truly received SNAP (weighted 57.6% of the analytical sample, using the FoodAPS 
variable “snapnowadmin”), implying that * 1 or 3,S =  with 0SNAPV =  (42.4% of the sample) 
conversely implying that * 0 or 2.S = 14 
Using a potential outcomes framework, we focus on ATEs associated with participating 
in both food assistance programs versus a single program, or compared with no participation: 
    { }= [ ( = ) 1| ] [ ( = ) 1| ]  for  , 0,1, 2,3 ,  jkATE P Y S j X P Y S k X j k j k∗ ∗= − = ∈ ≠    (1)  
where ( )Y S ∗  indicates the (latent) potential food security outcome under treatment S ∗, X denotes 
any covariates of interest, and P denotes the probability of an outcome.  Because there are no 
                                                 
14 Households with VSNAP = 0 include verified SNAP non-participants (weighted 2.6% of the analytical sample), 
households that could not be matched to existing administrative records (26.8%; most likely due to true 
nonparticipation), households that could not be matched because states provided no or insufficient administrative 
data (10.7%), and households that withheld consent for the administrative match (2.3%). For simplicity, we treat all 
of these households as true nonparticipants. 
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regression orthogonality conditions to be satisfied in this framework, there is no need to include 
covariates as a means of avoiding omitted variable bias. Instead, covariates serve only to 
condition on subpopulations of interest.15 To simplify notation, we suppress the conditioning on 
X and write [ ( = ) = 1]P Y S j∗  more compactly as [ ( ) 1]P Y j = . 
In this application, we are interested in the case of 3j =  vs. 1k = . Specifically, 
31 [ (3) 1]ATE P Y= =  [ (1) 1]P Y− =  measures how the prevalence of food security would change if 
all eligible households participated in both SNAP and WIC rather than in SNAP alone.16 One 
cannot identify 31ATE  without additional assumptions, even if S is accurately reported, because 
the potential outcome ( = 3)Y S ∗  is observed only for households that chose to participate in both 
SNAP and WIC, while ( = 1)Y S ∗  is observed only for households that chose to participate in 
SNAP alone. The decomposition * *[ (3) 1] [ (3) 1| 3] ( 3)P Y P Y S P S= = = = =
* *[ (3) 1| 3] ( 3)P Y S P S+ = ≠ ≠  highlights the selection problem: the term *[ (3) 1| 3]P Y S= ≠  
represents an unobserved counterfactual outcome, namely, the likelihood of food security when 
participating in SNAP and WIC jointly among households that actually chose not to be on both 
programs. 
As a further identification problem, households are thought to systematically underreport 
program participation in national surveys, and such misreporting may be related to personal 
characteristics (including the food security outcome itself). Allowing S to deviate from *S , let 
, *( , , ) for , {0,1,2,3}j ki P Y i S j S k j kθ ≡ = = = =  denote the fraction of households with food 
security status i reporting participation status j when true participation status is k. Using the law 
of total probability, the first term in 31ATE  becomes 
3,3 3, 3
1 1[ (3) 1] ( 1, 3)P Y P Y S θ θ
− −= = = = + −   
* , , , ,
1 0 1 0
3
[ (3) 1| 3] ( 3) ( )j j j j j j j j
j
P Y S P S θ θ θ θ− − − −
≠
 
+ = ≠ ≠ + + − − 
 
∑ , where 
                                                 
15 A tradeoff is that we cannot point-identify the ATE. 
16 Note that we are not restricting a treatment effect to be the same across households. As emphasized by Moffitt 
(2005), the classical linear response model assumption, for example, is difficult to justify in the case of government 
assistance programs that are thought to have heterogeneous effects. 
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, *( , , )j ki P Y i S j S kθ
− ≡ = ≠ =   and , *( , , ).j ki P Y i S j S kθ
− ≡ = = ≠  An analogous expression can be 
derived for [ (1) 1].P Y =  
 Without further assumptions, propositions in JKZ can be used to show that the marginal 
impact on food security associated with participating in both SNAP and WIC, compared with 
participating in SNAP alone, is bounded as follows: 
3,1
3,1
3,1
1 ( 1, 3) ( 0, 1)
1 ( 0, 3) ( 1, 1)
LB
UB
P Y S P Y S
ATE
P Y S P Y S
− + = = + = = +Θ
≤
− = = − Θ
≤
= = +
    (2) 
where 3,3 3, 3 1,1 1, 13,1 1 1 0 0
LB θ θ θ θ− − − −Θ ≡ − + −  and 3,3 3, 3 1,1 1, 13,1 0 0 1 1
UB θ θ θ θ− − − −Θ ≡ − + − +  could each be positive 
or negative.  Terms like ( 1, 3)P Y S= =  are observed from the data, but the { }θ  components are 
unobserved.  Thus, the ATE bounds in Equation (2) are not yet operational.   
In our FoodAPS sample, we have ( 1, 3) 0.238,P Y S= = =   ( 0, 1) 0.159,P Y S= = =
 ( 0, 3) 0.165,P Y S= = =  and  ( 1, 1) 0.172.P Y S= = =   Thus, in our application, the bounds in 
Equation (2) become 
   3,1 3,1 3,10.663 .0.603
LB UBATE+Θ +Θ≤− ≤  
If participation in SNAP and WIC were accurately measured, then setting 3,1
LBΘ  and 3,1
UBΘ  equal to 
zero would reduce the bounds in Equation (2) to Manski’s (1995) classic worst-case ATE 
bounds: [ 0.603,0.663].− 17  While obviously very wide, it is instructive to recognize that the data 
alone (if accurately measured) constrain the possible range of 3,1ATE  to improve on the range [-
1,1]. Since ( 1, 3)P Y S= =  in Equation (2) is greater than zero, we know that not all households 
participating in both SNAP and WIC are food insecure. Also, since ( 0, 1)P Y S= =  is greater than 
zero, we know that participating in both programs does not cause all households to become food 
                                                 
17 With a binary treatment, the Manski bounds would have a width equal to 1 (and always include 0).  In the present 
context with multiple treatments, the Manski bounds have a width greater than 1.   
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secure; some were already food secure while participating in SNAP alone. These positive 
probabilities raise the lower bound above -1. Similar logic ensures that the upper bound is less 
than 1 (again, when SNAP and WIC participation are accurately measured). 
In the context of food assistance programs, however, participation is thought to be 
underreported.  Still, the error rates 3,1
LBΘ  and 3,1
UBΘ  are logically bounded. For example, 1,11θ
−  cannot 
exceed ( 1, 1) 0.378,P Y S= ≠ =  another quantity directly observed in the data.  Without 
knowledge about the nature and degree of reporting errors, however, nothing prevents the worst 
case bounds in Equation (2) from expanding to [ 1, 1],−  in which case they are completely 
uninformative.  For the upper bound, for example, 3, 30θ
−  could be as large as ( 0, 3)P Y S= =  
0.165,=  while 1, 11θ
−  could be as large as ( 1, 1) 0.172.P Y S= = =   Since 3,30θ
−  and 1,11θ
−  could both be 
0, the upper bound in Equation (2) attains 1. Analogously, the lower bound attains -1. 
3.2. Partial Validation Data in FoodAPS 
Partial validation data in FoodAPS allow us to place informative restrictions on the 
magnitudes of  3,1
LBΘ  and 3,1 .
UBΘ   Knowledge of whether or not a household truly participates in 
SNAP is not enough to pinpoint the value of *S , which represents the true joint participation 
status. In particular, confirmation of participation in SNAP merely identifies that * {1,3};S ∈  that 
is, the household might be participating in SNAP alone or in both SNAP and WIC. Similarly, 
confirmation of nonparticipation in SNAP merely identifies that * {0,2};S ∈  the household may 
have been participating in neither program or in WIC alone.   
Still, confirmation of SNAP participation status – and modifying the observed treatment 
indicator S accordingly to align with known values – allows us to eliminate many of the error 
components of 3,1
LBΘ   and 3,1 .
UBΘ   Specifically, 0,3 1,3 2,3 3,0 3,1 3,23,1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( )
LB θ θ θ θ θ θΘ ≡ + + − + +
0,1 2,1 3,1 1,0 1,2 1,3
0 0 0 0 0 0( ) ( )θ θ θ θ θ θ+ + + − + +  reduces to 
1,3 3,1 3,1 1,3
3,1 1 1 0 0
LB θ θ θ θΘ = − + −  because 
0,3 2,3 3,0 3,2 0,1 2,1 1,0 1,2
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ= = = = = = = =   These eight (out of the 12) error components 
vanish using the FoodAPS validation information.  For example, *0,31 ( 1, 0, 3) 0P Y S Sθ ≡ = = = =  
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since SNAP validation rules out cases in which a household ends up falsely classified as 
participating in neither program since we have documentation that the household participated at 
least in SNAP.  Similarly, 0,3 1,3 2,33,1 0 0 0( )
UB θ θ θΘ ≡ − + +  3,0 3,1 3,20 0 0( )θ θ θ+ + +
0,1 2,1 3,1
1 1 1( )θ θ θ− + +  
1,0 1,2 1,3
1 1 1( )θ θ θ+ + +  reduces to 
1,3 3,1 3,1 1,3
3,1 0 0 1 1
UB θ θ θ θΘ = − + − +  since 0,3 2,30 0θ θ=  
3,0 3,2
0 0θ θ= =  
0,1 2,1
1 1θ θ= =  
1,0 1,2
1 1 0.θ θ= = =  18 
Using the FoodAPS validation data, the average treatment effect bounds in Equation (2) 
are thus narrowed as follows: 
                                
1,3 3,1 3,1 1,3
1 1 0 0
3,1
1,3 3,1 3,1 1,3
1 1 0 0 .
1 ( 1, 3) ( 0, 1)
1 ( 0, 3) ( 1, 1)
P Y S P Y S
ATE
P Y S P Y S
θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
− +
≤
+ = = + = = + − −
≤
− = = − = = + − + −
   (3) 
Note that the error components 1,3 3,1 3,1 1,31 1 0 0θ θ θ θ− + −  shift the lower and upper bound by the same 
unknown constant.  In our application,  
         1,3 3,1 3,1 1,3 1,3 3,1 3,1 1,31 1 0 0 3,1 1 1 0 0 .0.603 0.663ATEθ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ− + − + − ≤ + + −≤ −  
 Despite eliminating eight of the 12 error components in 3,1
LBΘ  and 3,1 ,
UBΘ  the bounds in 
Equation (3) are still uninformative: the ATE may still lie anywhere between -1 and 1.  To see 
this, it is instructive to understand why the bounds in Equation (3) are informative in the absence 
of measurement error.  In that case, the lower bound is elevated above -1 because some fraction 
of households ( 1, 3) 0.238P Y S= = =  are known to be food secure while participating in both 
SNAP and WIC, while another fraction ( 0, 1) 0.159P Y S= = =  are known to be food insecure 
while participating in SNAP alone. The presence of these groups reveals that, at least sometimes, 
participation in both programs is not harmful relative to participation in SNAP alone.  Similarly, 
                                                 
18 Although we formally treat administrative data in FoodAPS as the gold standard for SNAP participation, we 
recognize that these data may contain some errors themselves (e.g., if the household matching algorithm has 
imperfections).  
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the upper bound cannot attain 1 when some fraction of households ( 0, 3) 0.165P Y S= = =  are 
known to be food insecure despite participating in both programs, and some from fraction 
( 1, 1) 0.172P Y S= = =  are food secure despite participating only in SNAP.  Thus, at least 
sometimes, participation in both programs is not beneficial compared with participation in SNAP 
alone. 
 In the presence of classification error, the difficulty is that *3,11 ( 1, 3, 1)P Y S Sθ = = = =  in 
the lower bound could be as large as ( 1, 3) 0.238P Y S= = =  while *1,30 ( 0, 1, 3)P Y S Sθ = = = =  
could be as large as ( 0, 1) 0.159.P Y S= = =  Without further assumptions to constrain the patterns 
or degrees of misclassification, logically we cannot rule out the possibility that food secure 
households claiming to participate in both programs were actually participating only in SNAP.  
Nor can we rule out the possibility that food insecure households claiming to participate in 
SNAP alone were actually participating in both programs. Setting the other error components to 
zero as a worst case, the lower bound falls to -1, becoming uninformative. Similarly, the upper 
bound rises to 1. While these scenarios are extreme, they help crystalize how data must be 
combined with assumptions before we can make logical, informative inferences.    
 FoodAPS currently does not contain information that can be used to validate WIC 
participation status.19 Thus, we cannot further constrain the four remaining error components in 
3,1
LBΘ  and 3,1
UBΘ  using data alone.  To learn anything about 3,1,ATE  we need to impose assumptions 
about the magnitudes or patterns of reporting errors.  We aim to strike a balance between making 
assumptions that are weak enough to be credible but strong enough to be informative.   
3.3. No False Positives 
We can make further progress in bounding 3,1ATE  by imposing a common “no false positives” 
assumption in the food assistance literature (e.g., Almada et al., 2016; Kreider, Pepper, 
                                                 
19 For future research, there is information reported on food expenditures funded through WIC vouchers at purchase 
events that might be used to partially validate participation. Of concern is the potential for lags in the timing of using 
WIC benefits after no longer being certified as a program participant.  
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Gundersen, and Joliffe, 2012, referenced below as  KPGJ) that households do not falsely report 
benefits they do not actually receive. Validation data from previous studies find only rare 
instances of these errors of commission (e.g., Bollinger and David, 1997; Marquis and Moore, 
1990). In our FoodAPS sample, for example, only 1.8% of those reporting SNAP benefits were 
found not to be receiving them. 
   Under the no false positives assumption, the ATE bounds in Equation (3) shrink further 
and become informative: 
              
1,3 1,3
1 0
3,1
1,3 1,3
1 0 .
1 ( 1, 3) ( 0, 1)
1 ( 0, 3) ( 1, 1)
P Y S P Y S
ATE
P Y S P Y S
θ θ
θ θ
− + = = + = = + −
≤
− = = − = −
≤
= +
     (4) 
 
Note that the error components 1,3 1,31 0θ θ−  shift the lower and upper bound by the same unknown 
constant. Taking worst cases across 1,31θ  and 
1,3
0θ  in Equation (4), JKZ show that 3,1ATE  is sharply 
bounded as 
          3,11 ( 1, 3) 1 ( 0, 3).
WCS ATEP Y P Y S− + = =≤= ≤ − =      (5) 
These worst-case bounds are presented in Panel A (no additional assumptions) of Table 
6.  The bounds are very wide, with the width of 2 ( 0, 3) ( 1, 3)P Y S P Y S− = = − = = . In our 
sample, 3,1
WCATE  may lie anywhere in the range [ 0.762,0.835]−  with a width of 1.60.  We have 
made important progress, however, in moving away from the [-1, 1] uninformative bounds.  
Specifically, a fraction of households ( 1, 3) 0.238P Y S= = =  are food secure while claiming to 
participate in both programs, thus raising the lower bound away from -1. We trust their 
participation responses under the no false positives assumption. Similarly, a fraction of 
households ( 0, 3) 0.165P Y S= = =  are food insecure despite participating in both programs, 
lowering the upper bound away from 1.     
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 To gain an understanding of how misreporting affects uncertainty about 3,1
WCATE  beyond 
uncertainty due to unknown counterfactuals, we trace out the bounds in Equation (4) as a 
function of *( 3 | 0, 1)P S Y S= = =  and *( 3 | 1, 1)P S Y S= = =  in Figure 1. The figure utilizes a heat 
map. The blue surface depicts the lower bound on 3,1
WCATE , while the yellow surface depicts the 
upper bound. The planes are parallel in this case given the structure of the worst-case bounds in 
Equation (4). The small red circles identify the bounds in the reference case of no classification 
error, with the dashed vertical red line spanning the range of these bounds. The worst-case lower 
bound in Equation (5) is attained at the bottom right corner of the blue surface, where 
*( 3 | 0, 1) 1P S Y S= = = =  and *( 3 | 1, 1) 0.P S Y S= = = =  The worst-case upper bound is attained 
at the top left corner of the yellow surface, where *( 3 | 0, 1) 0P S Y S= = = =  and 
*( 3 | 1, 1) 1P S Y S= = = = . We will return to this figure when discussing an additional 
nondifferential errors assumption and its associated 45° solid blue lines. 
 One way to narrow the bounds in Panel A is to further restrict the nature of classification 
errors. Suppose, for example, that misreporting of SNAP or WIC participation arises 
independently of the household’s food security status. This nondifferential errors assumption 
specifies that  
  *( | , 1)P S j S k Y= = =  *( | , 0).P S j S k Y= = = =        (6) 
Evidence from FoodAPS suggests that food secure and food insecure households are 
about equally likely to misreport the receipt of food assistance.20  In this case, we can write 
1,3 1,3
0 1κθ θ=  in Equation (4), where ( 0, 1) / ( 1, 1)P Y S P Y Sκ ≡ = = = =  is observed in the data: 
    
1,3
1
3,1
1,3
1 .
1 ( 1, 3) ( 0, 1) (1 )
1 ( 0, 3) ( 1, 1) (1 )
P Y S P Y S
ATE
P Y S P Y S
κ θ
κ θ
− + = = + = = + −
≤
− = = − −
≤
= = +
       (7)  
                                                 
20 The chance of being found to participate in SNAP when claiming otherwise is about 49% among food secure 
households and 44% among food insecure households. The fractions are also similar to each other for the rare cases 
of reporting SNAP benefits not actually received.   
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This assumption has substantial identifying power in our application, especially when κ  is close 
to 1. In fact, when 1κ = , which implies that half of the households reporting participation in 
SNAP alone are food secure, with the other half being food insecure, classification error ceases 
to be an issue.  In that case, the worst-case bounds in Equation (7) reduce to Manski’s (1995) 
classic worst-case bounds in Section 3.1.  Otherwise, the bounds under the nondifferential errors 
assumption reduce to the bounds shown in Panel B of Table 6: 
         
{ }
{ }
3,1
1 ( 1, 3) min ( 0, 1), ( 1, 1)
1 ( 0, 3) min ( 0, 1), ( 1, 1) .
ND
P Y S P Y S P Y S
ATE
P Y S P Y S P Y S
− + = = + = = = =
≤
− = = = = =
≤
− =
  (7') 
 Notice the similarity between these bounds and Manski’s worst-case bounds in Equation 
(2) under no measurement error 3,1 3,1( 0).
LB UBΘ = Θ =  When 1,κ =  the bounds are identical: SNAP 
verification combined with no false positives and nondifferential errors is equivalent to no 
measurement error at all.  When 1κ >  such that more than half of the households reporting 
participation in SNAP alone are food insecure, the Table 6 Panel B upper bound is identical to 
Manski’s no-errors upper bound.  When 1κ <  such that more than half of the households 
reporting participation in SNAP alone are food secure, the Panel B lower bound is identical to 
Manski’s no-errors lower bound.   
 In our sample, 0.92 1κ = <  which implies ( 0, 1) ( 1, 1).P Y S P Y S= = < = =  Thus, the Panel 
B bounds become  
                    3,1
1 ( 1, 3) ( 0, 1)
1 ( 0, 3) ( 0, 1).
P Y S P Y S
ATE
P Y S P Y S
− + = = + = =
= =
≤≤
− = − =
   (7'') 
The worst-case bounds narrow from  to [ 0.603,0.676]−  with a width of 1.28, a 32 
percentage point reduction in the width.  The lower bound of -0.603 is identical to Manski’s 
[ 0.762,0.835]−
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lower bound (which presumes accurate reporting). Returning to Figure 1, the worst-case bounds 
shrink as they become restricted to lie on the solid blue lines. These 45° lines impose the 
Equation (6) constraint that the true fraction of households participating in both SNAP and WIC 
among those reporting participation in SNAP alone, * *( 3 | 1),P S S= =  does not vary by food 
security status, Y.  In particular, the lowest feasible value of 3,1ATE  is no longer at the bottom 
right corner of the blue plane, and the highest feasible value is no longer at the top left corner of 
the yellow plane. 
As a polar case, Panel C of Table 6 and Figure 2A highlight the identifying power of an 
exogenous selection assumption that, on average, potential outcomes do not depend on the 
realized treatment: 
                   *[ ( ) 1] [ ( ) 1| ] , .P Y j P Y j S k j k= = = = ∀    (8) 
This assumption would make sense if households were randomly assigned to food assistance 
programs such that there were no systematic differences in household attributes across treatment 
groups.  In this case, the lower and upper bound planes coincide. In the absence of classification 
error, the bounds collapse to a point, 0.0384, depicted by the small red circle.  The closed-form 
bounds across all values of the error components are provided in Panel C of Table 6. In our 
application, the worst-case bounds narrow from [ 0.762,0.835]−  to [ 0.576,0.713]−  under 
exogenous selection. Even though the exogeneity assumption eliminates uncertainty associated 
with unknown counterfactuals, the bounds remain very wide due to potential measurement error 
in WIC participation status.   
Now consider exogenous selection with nondifferential errors (Panel D of Table 6). 
Figure 2B shows how the exogenous selection bounds in our application become further 
constrained under the additional nondifferential errors assumption reflected by the 45° solid blue 
line. As above, this constraint imposes the restriction that * *( 3 | 1)P S S= =  does not vary with 
food security status, Y. The added horizontal zero plane helps to see that the ATE is strictly 
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positive across all values of the error components.  Using the closed-form bounds in Panel D of 
Table 6, the average treatment effect is isolated to lie in the narrow range [0.0384,0.0701] with 
width 0.0316, nearly point-identifying the parameter. This upper bound is computed as 
( 1| 3) ( 1| 1)P Y S P Y S= = − = =  = 0.0701, the observed difference in food security rates between 
households reporting participation in both programs vs. those reporting participation in SNAP 
alone.21  
 3.4. Monotonicity Assumptions 
Because households choose to participate in food programs on their own accord, 
exogenous selection, while an important reference case, is an untenable assumption in our 
setting. Therefore, we do not impose this independence assumption in the remainder of the 
analysis.  Instead, we study how the Table 6 Panel A and B worst-case bounds can be narrowed 
under relatively weak monotonicity restrictions such as Monotone Treatment Selection (Manski 
and Pepper, 2000; KPGJ) and Monotone Treatment Response (Manski, 1997; KPGJ). The MTS 
assumption formalizes the notion that unobserved factors related to food insecurity are likely to 
be positively associated with the decision to take up food assistance. Under the MTR 
assumption, participating in SNAP and WIC would not harm food security, on average, 
conditional on treatment. 
Formally, MTS in our partially-ordered treatment framework is specified as: 
                  * * *[ ( ) 1 3] [ ( ) 1 ] [ ( ) 1 0]    .| | and 1,2|P Y j S P Y j S k P Y j S j k= = ≤ = = ≤ = = ∀ =         (9) 
For each potential treatment j, we posit that the latent food security probability is (weakly) less 
favorable among households that enrolled in both programs *( 3)S =  compared with only one 
program *( 1 or 2),S =  and similarly less favorable among households that enrolled in one 
program compared with no program *( 0).S =   We impose no ordering between households that 
                                                 
21 JKZ show that either the lower or upper bound is given by this difference in conditional means depending on 
whether κ is less than or greater than 1.   
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enroll in only one program versus the other.  The MTS assumption does not imply that any 
households would be better off changing their participation status—only that those who chose to 
participate in more programs start out relatively disadvantaged, on average, under any potential 
treatment.  Returning to Table 6, the MTS lower bound is given by (see Panel E)   
     3,1
( 1, 3)1
( 3) ( 0, 1)
MTSP Y S ATE
P S P Y S
= =
− + ≤
= + = =
 
with the upper bound unchanged compared with the worst-case upper bound provided in Panel 
A.  Using the FoodAPS data, the worst-case bounds shrink from [ 0.762,0.835]−  to 
[ 0.576,0.835].−   The lower bound is improved further by combining MTS with the 
nondifferential errors assumption as shown in Panel F: 
 
[ ]
3,1
( 1, 3) ( 1, 1)  1 max ( 1| 3), ( 0 | 1) ( 3) ( 1)
( 3) ( 1)
.MTS
P Y S P Y SP Y S P Y S P S P S
P Y P Y
ATE
 = = + = =
− + = = + = = = + = 
= + = 
≤
 
In our application, the improvement is dramatic. In particular, the Panel E bounds narrow from 
[ 0.576,0.835]−  to [ 0.058,0.676]−  in Panel F. The lower bound is improved 70 percentage points 
compared with the Frame B worst-case lower bound, and it is improved 54 percentage points 
compared with Manski’s no-errors worst-case lower bound. Figures 3A and 3B reveal how the 
MTS bounds and the MTS bounds with nondifferential errors, respectively, vary with the values 
of *( 3 | 0, 1)P S Y S= = =  and *( 3 | 1, 1).P S Y S= = =    
To formally specify the MTR assumption, we slightly modify Manski’s (1995; 1997) 
original approach. For a given realized program participation status, we suppose that potential 
participation in SNAP alone or WIC alone would not harm a household’s food security on 
average compared with no participation, nor would participation in both programs be detrimental 
on average compared with participation in either program alone:  
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  * * *[ (3) 1| ] [ (1) 1| ] [ (0) 1| ]P Y S P Y S P Y S= ≥ = ≥ =   
   * * *[ (3) 1| ] [ (2) 1| ] [ (0) 1| ].P Y S P Y S P Y S= ≥ = ≥ =      (10) 
In isolation, this assumption is uninformative, since it precludes strictly negative effects by 
construction.  It can have useful identifying power, however, when combined with the 
instrumental variable assumptions described next.  In particular, it assures that the effect is 
nonnegative across all values of the instrument. It is difficult to imagine that participation in 
more food assistance programs would itself cause more food insecurity, at least on average 
(Currie, 2003). 
We can further narrow the bounds by employing MIVs. Monotone instruments are often 
easier to motivate than standard IVs because they do not require any orthogonality/exclusion 
restrictions. In our application, we merely require that the instrument leads to a weakly improved 
latent food security outcome, on average, conditional on the treatment. As MIVs, we use 
variables reflective of important aspects of local food environment, as recorded in FoodAPS-
GC.22 In particular, we employ the ratio of actual household expenditures on food at home to 
food expenditures consistent with the TFP recommendations and local food prices (the 
expenditure MIV).23 We also investigate the usefulness of a conventional income-to-poverty 
MIV based on household income and composition considered in KPGJ. An assumption 
underlying these monotone instruments is that, broadly speaking, more resources in the 
household and access to cheaper food cannot harm food security. Unlike a standard IV, there is 
no exclusion restriction that the monotone instrument can affect food security only through its 
                                                 
22 Previous studies have shown that the local food environment is an important contributor to food security and 
health through differences in access, availability, and cost of food (e.g., Rose and Richards, 2004; Ver Ploeg, 2010; 
Bonanno and Goetz, 2012; Lee, 2012). In particular, the relative cost of food in the area can substantially affect a 
low-income household’s ability to provide an adequate diet to its members. Zhylyevskyy et al. (2013) find that 
lower relative fruit and vegetable prices positively affect the selection of these foods in a study of African American 
youths and parents. 
23 We report the results for the MIV based on food prices at food stores located within 20 miles of the household’s 
place of residence. 
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effect on program participation. The MTS assumption described above is a special case of the 
MIV assumption in which the treatment *S  itself is the instrument.   
Let u represent a monotone instrument. The MIV assumption specifies that higher values 
of u lead to weakly improved food security outcomes, on average, under each treatment:  
1 2 1 2[ ( ) 1| = ] [ ( ) 1| = ] [ ( ) 1| = ]u u u P Y j v u P Y j v u P Y j v u≤ ≤ ⇒ = ≤ = ≤ =  for each j.      
While these conditional probabilities are not identified, they can be bounded as described by 
Manski and Pepper (2000). Bounds on the unconditional latent probability, [ ( ) 1],P Y j =  can, in 
turn, be obtained by applying the law of total probability and calculating a weighted average of 
the bounds on [ ( ) 1| = ]P Y j v u=  over different values of u.24  When combined with MTS or 
MTR, those restrictions are assumed to apply at each value of the instrument, v. 
Table 7 demonstrates the identifying power of combinations of the MTS, MTR, MIV, 
and nondifferential errors assumptions when SNAP participation status is known (though 
administrative data) and WIC participation may be underreported. Point estimates (p.e.) of the 
bounds are provided along with Imbens-Manski (2004) confidence intervals (CI) that cover the 
true value of the ATE with 95% probability.  Strictly positive estimated average treatment effects 
are highlighted in bold.  The key finding is that we can identify the ATE as strictly positive and 
statistically significant when combining the MTS, MTR, expenditure MIV, and measurement 
error assumptions.  Participating in both SNAP and WIC compared with participating in SNAP 
alone is estimated to increase the food security rate among low-income households in our sample 
by at least 24 percentage points.  Accounting for sampling variability reflected in the confidence 
interval, food security would rise by at least 1.9 percentage points (see the bottom right cell in 
Panel A of Table 7).    
The large difference between the point estimate of the lower bound and the confidence 
interval lower bound reflects our relatively small sample size of 460 households. A larger sample 
                                                 
24 As noted by Manski and Pepper (2000), the MIV estimator is consistent but biased in finite samples.  We employ 
Kreider and Pepper’s (2007) modified MIV estimator that accounts for the finite sample bias using a nonparametric 
bootstrap correction method.  
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size would not necessarily shrink the width of the estimated bounds on the average treatment 
effect since the point estimates of the bounds are consistently estimated. However, these bounds 
would be more precisely estimated. In our setting, the availability of carefully constructed SNAP 
validation data outweighs our concern about a relatively small sample size.   
4. Conclusion 
Low-income households in the United States often receive benefits from more than one food 
assistance program administered by USDA, which raises the question of whether these programs 
could have meaningful synergies or might be redundant. We investigate the issue by focusing on 
two popular programs, SNAP and WIC, and apply a novel nonparametric bounding methodology 
to handle a multinomial, partially ordered treatment, endogenous household selection into 
assistance programs, and underreported program participation in a unifying framework. The 
literature has shown that even small amounts of misreporting in surveys can lead to substantial 
identification decay of treatment effect parameters of interest (e.g., Millimet, 2011). This paper 
traces out how the availability of validation data, even for only one of the potential treatments, 
has the potential to substantially sharpen what can be known about the causal effects of multiple 
program participation.  
We draw on a unique aspect of FoodAPS in that it provides auxiliary administrative data 
on SNAP participation, which allows us to partially validate the treatment variable. Under 
endogenous household selection into the programs, Manski’s (1995) classical treatment effect 
bounds are wide and contain zero, which makes it impossible to sign the causal effects. The 
bounds become even wider in our environment of systematically underreported program 
participation. However, we are able to substantially narrow the bounds by combining 
conventional, relatively mild monotonicity assumptions on the selection process and restrictions 
on the patterns of WIC misclassification. Our objective is to strike a balance between making 
assumptions that are weak enough to be credible but strong enough to be informative. 
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The methods showcase what can be learned about treatment effects regarding multiple 
programs when validation data are available for one program but not the other. Exploiting the 
administratively validated SNAP data in FoodAPS, our key finding is that we can identify the 
average treatment effect as strictly positive under relatively weak assumptions on the selection 
process combined with a food expenditure monotone instrumental variable.  Monotone 
instrumental variables are weaker than standard IVs in that they require no a priori exclusion 
restrictions. Among eligible households, we estimate that participating in both SNAP and WIC 
compared with participating in SNAP alone would increase the food security rate by at least 24 
percentage points. While this estimated lower bound is large and statistically significant, it is not 
precisely estimated.  With our relatively small sample size of 460 households, food security 
might rise by as little as 1.9 percentage points after accounting for sampling variability reflected 
in the 95 percent confidence interval.  
Overall, our results provide evidence that SNAP and WIC are not redundant. These 
findings have direct policy relevance in that they inform policymakers about the existence of 
complementarities between SNAP and WIC, which can help contribute to designing a more 
efficient food safety net in the United States.  The degree of the complementarity remains an 
open question owing in part to the relatively small sample size in our analysis. Moreover, the 
SNAP administrative data could themselves contain errors (e.g., if the household matching 
algorithm has imperfections), and we do not have direct evidence about the nature of WIC 
classification errors. Validation of participation status for WIC and other assistance programs 
beyond SNAP would allow for narrower and more reliable bounds on the average treatment 
effects of interest.  
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Table 1. Sample Distribution by Reported Program Participation (Weighted)  
 
  
WIC 
  No Yes 
SN
A
P No 15.3% 16.6% 
Yes 31.4% 36.7% 
 
Notes: This table provides the joint distribution of the analytical sample (N = 460) by self-reported household 
participation in SNAP and WIC. Observations are weighted using FoodAPS household weights. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Sample Distribution by Reported WIC Participation and Administratively Matched SNAP 
Participation (Weighted) 
 
 
  
WIC 
  No Yes 
SN
A
P 
No 13.0% 13.6% 
Yes 33.6% 39.7% 
 
Notes: This table provides the joint distribution of the analytical sample (N = 460) by household participation in 
SNAP and WIC. WIC participation is self-reported. SNAP participation incorporates administrative data. In 
particular, for households that can be matched to administrative records, SNAP participation status reflects the 
administrative record. For households that cannot be matched, SNAP participation is self-reported. Observations are 
weighted using FoodAPS household weights. 
  
Table 3. Prevalence of Food Security in Subsamples by Self-Reported Program Participation 
(Weighted)  
 
  
WIC 
  No Yes 
SN
A
P 
No 53.2% 54.5% 
Yes 52.2% 58.5% 
 
Notes: This table shows the prevalence of food security (in percent, weighted) in each of the four subsamples 
defined according to self-reported participation in SNAP and WIC. Observations are weighted using FoodAPS 
household weights. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Prevalence of Food Security in Subsamples by Self-Reported WIC Participation and 
Administratively Matched SNAP Participation (Weighted) 
 
  
WIC 
  No Yes 
SN
A
P 
No 55.1% 50.5% 
Yes 51.6% 59.5% 
 
Notes: This table shows the prevalence of food security (in percent, weighted) in each of the four subsamples 
defined according to self-reported participation in WIC and administratively matched participation in SNAP. 
Observations are weighted using FoodAPS household weights. 
 
 
  
Table 5. Selected Characteristics of Analytical Sample (Weighted) 
 
Characteristic Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Household characteristics:     
Number of household members 4.48 1.76 1 ≥ 10 a 
Number of children 2.34 1.31 0 ≥ 7 a 
Number of children aged 0–6 years 1.57 0.93 0 ≥ 5 a 
Household monthly income, $ 1,606.69 954.32 0 ≥ 4,000 a 
Income-to-poverty ratio 0.75 0.36 0 1.30 
Weekly expenditures on food at 
home, $ 112.92 126.00 0 ≥ 1,000 a 
Rural household 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Household rents its residence 0.78 0.41 0 1 
No household member owns or 
leases a vehicle 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Household has used food pantry 
(past 30 days) 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Primary respondent’s characteristics:    
Female 0.88 0.32 0 1 
Age, years 33.71 10.75 17 ≥ 70 a 
Hispanic (ethnicity) 0.33 0.47 0 1 
White (race) 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Black (race) 0.29 0.45 0 1 
All other races 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Less than high school degree 0.32 0.47 0 1 
High school degree 0.24 0.43 0 1 
GED 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Some college education 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Associate’s degree 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Bachelor’s or higher degree 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Single (never married) 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Married 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Divorced 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Separated 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Widowed 0.02 0.17 0 1 
Employed 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Looking for work 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Not working 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics for selected characteristics of the analytical sample. Observations are 
weighted using FoodAPS household weights. 
a
 An exact maximum value is suppressed due to confidentiality requirements. 
  
Table 6.  Sharp Bounds on 3,1,ATE  the Impact on Food Security Associated with Participating in SNAP + 
WIC vs. SNAP Alone, Under No False Positives when SNAP but not WIC Status is Validated 
  
A.  No additional  
      assumptions 
3,1
1 ( 1, 3)
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P
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B.  Nondifferential errors  
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C.  Exogenous selection 
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D.  Exogenous selection +  
      nondifferential errors 
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E. Monotone Treatment  
     Selection (MTS)  
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Table 7. ATE Associated with Participating in Both SNAP and WIC vs. Participating in SNAP Alone 
 
(A) Expenditure MIV: 
                        Differential Errors          Nondifferential Errors 
 
                       MTS + MIV                    MTS + MIV 
                       LB     UB         width                LB        UB        width      
        p.e.  [-0.485,  0.634]   1.119        [ 0.239,    0.634]     0.394 
        CI    [-0.685,  0.768]                [ 0.006,    0.752]     
   MTR + MIV                    MTR + MIV 
                       LB     UB         width            LB        UB     width      
             p.e. [ 0.000,  0.634]     0.634    [ 0.000,  0.634]      0.634 
                 CI  [-0.164,  0.768]              [-0.164,  0.768]      
                            MTS + MTR + MIV         MTS + MTR + MIV 
                       LB     UB         width              LB       UB     width      
      p.e  [ 0.000,  0.634]     0.634         [ 0.242,    0.634]    0.392 
       CI      [-0.183,  0.768]               [ 0.019,    0.768]      
 
 
 (B) Income-to-Poverty MIV: 
                        Differential Errors          Nondifferential Errors 
 
                       MTS + MIV                    MTS + MIV 
                       LB     UB         width                LB        UB        width      
        p.e.  [-0.549,  0.657]   1.206        [ 0.0251,  0.657]     0.632 
        CI    [-0.694,  0.752]                [-0.143,    0.752]     
   MTR + MIV                    MTR + MIV 
                       LB     UB         width            LB        UB     width      
             p.e. [ 0.000,  0.657]     0.657    [ 0.000,  0.657]      0.657 
                 CI  [-0.118,  0.752]              [-0.118,  0.752]      
                            MTS + MTR + MIV         MTS + MTR + MIV 
                       LB     UB         width              LB       UB     width      
      p.e  [ 0.000,  0.657]     0.657         [ 0.0310,  0.657]    0.626 
       CI      [-0.118,  0.752]               [-0.135,    0.752]      
 
   
 
 
Figure 1. Bounds on ATE31 of Participating in SNAP+WIC vs. SNAP Alone Under Endogenous Selection.   
Note: The two planes represent the lower and upper bounds for the various combinations of *( 3 | 0, 1)P S Y S= = =  
and *( 3 | 1, 1)P S Y S= = = .  The red dashed line represents the identified set in the absence of reporting errors. The 
solid blue lines depict the bounds under the additional nondifferential errors restriction.  
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Figure 2A. Bounds on ATE31 of Participating in SNAP+WIC vs. SNAP Alone Under Exogenous Selection.   
Note: The average treatment effect is point-identified for given values of *( 3 | 0, 1)P S Y S= = =  and 
*( 3 | 1, 1)P S Y S= = = .  The small red circle represents the identified point in the absence of reporting errors.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2B. Bounds on ATE31 of Participating in SNAP+WIC vs. SNAP Alone Under Exogenous Selection and 
Nondifferential Errors. Note: Identical to Figure 2A, except (i) Figure 2B highlights the zero plane and (ii) the solid 
blue line depicts the point-identified value under the additional nondifferential errors restriction. 
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Figure 3A. Bounds on ATE31 of Participating in SNAP+WIC vs. SNAP Alone Under Monotone Treatment 
Selection (MTS). Note: The small red circles represent the bounds in the absence of reporting errors.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3B. Bounds on ATE31 of Participating in SNAP+WIC vs. SNAP Alone Under MTS and Nondifferential 
Errors. Note: Identical to Figure 3A, except (i) Figure 3B highlights the zero plane and (ii) the solid blue lines depict 
the bounds under the additional nondifferential errors restriction. 
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